谎报行为下生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

Supply Chain Coordination of Fresh Agricultural Products under the Behavior of Misreporting

中文关键词: 生鲜农产品  供应链  谎报行为  鲜活度  供应链协调  Stackelberg博弈

英文关键词: fresh agricultural product  supply chain  misreporting  freshness  supply chain coordination  Stackelberg game

中文摘要:

      目的 研究存在生产商谎报生鲜农产品鲜活度信息的情况下，生鲜农产品供应链的协调问题。方法 由单一生产商和单一零售商构成生鲜农产品供应链，其中产品的鲜活度信息为生产商私有信息；基于单周期报童模型，构建供应链各方的利润函数；应用Stackelberg博弈的基本思想，分析供应链上的定价订货决策，并引入收益共享契约进行供应链协调，同时用Matlab软件做数值仿真，以验证结论的有效性。结果 生产商的谎报行为会损害供应链系统各方的利润，且谎报因子越低（谎报度越高）对供应链利润的影响越大。引入的收益共享比例在一定范围内时，收益共享契约可以有效地协调生鲜农产品供应链。结论 收益共享契约不仅可以有效地协调生鲜供应链，也可以抑制生产商的谎报行为，实现帕累托改进，提高供应链的稳定性。

英文摘要:

      The work aims to study the coordination of the supply chain for fresh agricultural products in the case of supplier misreporting the fresh activity of fresh agricultural products. The supply chain of fresh agricultural products was composed of a single supplier and a single retailer and the fresh activity of products was the supplier's private information. Based on the single cycle newsboy model, the profit function of all parties in the supply chain was constructed, and the basic idea of Stackelberg game was applied. The results of pricing order decision were analyzed, and the profit sharing contract was introduced to coordinate the supply chain. At the same time, Matlab software was used for numerical simulation to verify the effectiveness of the conclusion. The misreporting behavior of the supplier damaged the profits of all parties in the supply chain system, and the lower the misreporting factor (the higher the false reporting degree) was, the greater the influence on the supply chain profit was. When the income sharing ratio was within a certain range, the income sharing contract could effectively coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural products. The benefit-sharing contract can effectively coordinate the fresh supply chain, and suppress the misreporting behavior of the supplier at the same time, which improves the Pareto and increases the stability of the supply chain.